The Welfare Gains of Trade Integration in the European Monetary Union ?
policy to national situations. This paper shows that the impact of trade integration is more contrasted when assuming that …nancial markets are incomplete and imperfectly integrated.
We lay out an estimated two-country DSGE model of the European Monetary Union (EMU) that accounts for the imperfect integration of both goods and …nancial markets. As in Ricci (1997) , the model encompasses real and monetary arguments for the costs of conducting a single monetary policy in a monetary union characterized by business cycles asymmetries and in ‡ation di¤erentials. Indeed, the model features home bias in private consumption and production technology, incomplete and imperfectly integrated private …nancial markets, Calvo type sticky prices, and i.i.d. productivity and public spending shocks. These assumptions are also set up to be consistent with the current economic situation of the EMU, characterized by persistent asymmetries in business cycles and signi…cant in ‡ation di¤erentials (see Camacho, Perez-Quiros and Saiz, 2006 and Lane, 2006 for discussions).
In this tractable framework, asymmetric shocks and/or shocks imply asymmetries in business cycles and in ‡ation di¤erentials that can not be addressed by the central bank of the monetary union. These business cycles asymmetries and in ‡ation di¤erentials translate into welfare costs, building on two mains sources: nominal inertia and imperfect risk-sharing combined to a costly access to …nancial markets. The role of nominal inertia in a monetary union, as well as means to reduce the associated costs, have already been extensively studied in the literature (see among others Bengino, 2004; Beetsma and Jensen, 2005 and Gali and Monacelli, 2008) . Less attention has been paid to welfare losses related to imperfectly integrated …nancial markets in a monetary union. In line with Carré and Collard (2003) , we show that imperfect risk-sharing crucially a¤ects the welfare costs of business cycles asymmetries and the size, sign and structure of welfare gains generated by trade integration.
First, we show that an increase of horizontal or vertical trade integration, modeled as a reduction of home bias in consumption or in production, increases the correlation of business cycles through an increase of mutual trade ‡ows. The overall adequacy of the common monetary policy to national situations is thus clearly improved. The volatility of national in ‡ation rates decreases, which signi…cantly improves the aggregate welfare in the monetary union. These results are in the spirit of those of Romer (1993) , but the mechanisms that lead to these e¤ects are di¤erent.
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Second, vertical and horizontal trade have opposite e¤ects on the pattern of external adjustment to asymmetric shocks. Vertical trade integration reduces the overall need for external adjustment, i.e. the volatility of the current account while horizontal trade increases it. Because …nancial markets are incomplete and imperfectly integrated, a higher (respectively lower) volatility of the current account increases (respectively dampens) the welfare costs related to the imperfect integration of …nancial markets and imperfect risk-sharing.
The result builds on the following mechanism. Using …nancial markets (the current account) more intensively to smooth their wealth over time, households increase (respectively decrease) their labor supply when contracting debts (respectively accumulating assets) to respect their intertemporal budget constraint. Since we consider a closed monetary union, debts contracted by the representative household of a country are necessarily equal to the cumulated assets of the representative household of the other country. As a result, increased movements of the current account are met by opposite changes in labor supplies. In the equilibrium, the distance of relative hours, relative wages and intermediate terms-of-trade to their natural equilibrium path (characterized by complete …nancial markets) increases, which generates welfare losses. The welfare gains of vertical trade integration are consequently reinforced, while the welfare gains of horizontal trade integration are reduced or turn into welfare losses, depending on parameterizations.
Quantitatively speaking, we highlight that vertical trade integration leads to important welfare gains for the whole range of possible parameters of the model. In the baseline estimation, we show that a 10% increase 2 of vertical trade implies an average welfare gain equivalent to a 12.76% rise of permanent consumption for a constant labor e¤ort. On the other hand, horizontal trade generates lower welfare gains or welfare losses, depending on the parametrization. In the baseline estimation, a 10% increase of horizontal tarde implies an average welfare loss equivalent to a 2.09% drop of permanent consumption. A sensitivity analysis shows that horizontal trade can lead to welfare gains, especially when the welfare costs of nominal rigidities increase or when the welfare costs of imperfect …nancial integration decrease.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a two-country model of an imperfectly integrated monetary union. Based on EMU data, Section 3 provides estimates for the structural parameters of the log-linear approximation of the model. The dynamics properties of the model are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 provides an extensive welfare analysis of an increase in trade integration and presents some sensitivity analysis. A last section o¤ers some concluding remarks.
An imperfectly integrated monetary union
The model describes a two-country world with a common currency. Each nation represents half of this monetary union. It is populated by N in…nitely-living households, a government, …rms producing intermediate and …nal goods, and importers assembling consumption goods. All goods are traded. Monetary policy is delegated to the central bank of the monetary union which controls the interest rate. The international …nancial market is incomplete and agents only trade one-period composite bonds. 
Households and national governments
In each country the number of in…nitely-living households is normalized to one. The representative household j 2 [0; 1] of nation i 2 fh; f g maximizes a welfare index,
(1) subject to,
and the following transversality condition,
In Eq.
(1), the subjective discount factor, , is equal to (1+ ) 1 , is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of private consumption and is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. The aggregate consumption bundle of agent (j) in country i is called C i t (j) and the quantity of labor that this agent supplies on the labor market N i t (j). Money holdings are not introduced in the utility function since the money market plays no role for the dynamics when the nominal interest rate is the monetary policy instrument (see Beetsma and Jensen, 2005) .
In Eq. (2), B i t (j) is the amount of one-period nominal bonds hold by the representative agent of country i at the end of period t 1, that pays a gross nominal rate of interest R t between periods (t 1) and t. The consumer price index (CPI) in country i is called P i t while P i;t corresponds to the producer price index (PPI) in country i. W i t is the nominal wage in country i in period t,
dk is the amount of pro…ts paid by monopolistic …nal goods producers, and T i (j) is a lump-sum transfer. Finally, in the budget constraint, AC i t (j) is a quadratic portfolio adjustment cost that households have to pay to …nancial intermediaries to access …nancial markets. The cost is de…ned according to,
3 Nominal exchange rate issues per se as well as the analysis of the conditions underlying the adoption of a common currency are beyond the scope of the paper.
where B i (j) is the steady state level of net foreign assets. The Euler condition that solves Eqs. (1)- (2) is a¤ected by portfolio adjustment costs since,
The portfolio adjustment cost parameter ( ) a¤ects the sensitivity of wealth's accumulation to a variation of the interest rate, as it becomes more or less costly to smooth consumption by accessing …nancial markets. For instance, when decreases, it is less costly for the households to access to the …nancial markets. The labor supply function is based on the traditional consumption/leisure arbitrage,
Governments
Governments choose the amount of public spending on the …nal goods market and balance their budget using lump-sum transfers. The budget constraint of the government is given by,
where is a proportional subsidy to …rms. Mixing monopolistic competition and Calvo staggered price contracts on …nal goods markets introduces several distortions with respect to the Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium. Nominal rigidities imply ine¢ cient ‡uctu-ations of both equilibrium in ‡ation and output while the assumption of monopolistic competition a¤ects the steady state. While monetary and/or …scal policy may address the …rst issue, an optimal subsidy is able to address the second issue and restores the …rst-best allocation in the steady state (see Benigno and Woodford, 2005) . National public spending are entirely home biased, i.e.,
where the level of aggregate public spending evolves according to,
where i g;t is an i.i.d. innovation.
Firms

Intermediate goods producers
The production of …nal goods consists in a two-step process. First, in each country i, a continuum of identical …rms (normalized to one) produce the same intermediate good and sell it on on a competitive market. The production function of these …rms is given by, 
The production function of …nal goods producer k located in country i is given by,
In this expression, X 
Final goods prices are governed by standard Calvo contracts. Each period, only a fraction (1 i ) of randomly selected …rms located in country i 2 fh; f g are allowed to set new prices. Assuming that …rms do not discriminate among markets they adress, these …rms choose the following optimal price P i;t (k);
Aggregating among …nal …rms and assuming behavioral symmetry of monopolistic producers, the average producer price level of …nal goods in country i 2 fh; f g is,
Importers
A continuum of importers build units of consumption goods % using domestic and foreign …nal goods according the following production function,
and sell them on perfectly competitive markets at the following price,
or equivalently,
is the home bias in the production of consumption goods, 1 is the elasticity of substitution among national varieties and is the elasticity of susbtitution between domestic and foreign …nal goods. Finally, we de…ne …nal terms-of-trade in the monetary union as,
It has now become standard to regard home bias parameters, such as 1 i or 1 i as a relevant measures of goods market openness. Indeed, in equilibrium, i and i are the share of imported goods in the production of …nal and consumption goods respectively (see Corsetti, 2006 and Monacelli, 2005) . In the remainder of the paper, we thus consider i and i directly as parameters measuring horizontal and vertical trade openness.
Monetary policy
A common central bank controls the nominal interest rate within the monetary union,
;
This rule is commonly used in the literature (see among others Taylor, 1993; Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1998 and Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999) . Furthermore, it is a fair approximation of the monetary policy of the European Central Bank with respect to its mission, i.e. the stabilization of aggregate in ‡ation in the EMU. Finally, a large empirical literature highlights the smoothness of the nominal interest rate variations in the euro area (see among others Peersman and Smets, 1999 and Gerlach and Schnabel, 2000) .
Markets equilibrium
We solve the model assuming that each country is the mirror image of the other on the goods market. Posing h = and h = we simply get f = (1 ) and f = (1 ).
A competitive equilibrium is de…ned as a sequence of quantities, 
and …nancial markets,
In the equilibrium, net foreign assets evolve as follows,
where DP i t is the dispersion of …nal goods production prices in country i.
Estimation
We estimate the log-linear version of the model using the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) of Hansen (1982) . 4 In the symmetric competitive ‡exible price steady state, we assume that A i = A = 1 and that = (1 ) 1 . Other steady state relations are given by,
We use quarterly data from EMU countries (OECD Economic Outlook quarterly database) posterior to the German reuni…cation, i.e. ranging from 1992 to 2006. Aggregates are converted in the same currency and we focus on the following seasonally adjusted series: GDP (without investment), private consumption, employment, GDP de ‡ator, trade balance and current account balance (as a percentage of GDP). We also take into account the evolution of the average nominal short-term interest rate in the EMU.
We build two regions based on the levels of nominal rigidities of EMU countries (see Benigno, 2004) . Table 1 indicates the percentage of goods prices in the consumer price index changing every month in EMU countries (data are borrowed from Alvarez et al., 2006) . We consider that countries in which less than 15% of CPI goods prices change every month belong to the group of high nominal rigidities and countries in which more than 15% of CPI goods prices change every month belong to the group of low nominal rigidities. Consequently, in the …rst group (region h in the model), we have Germany, Spain and Italy and in the second group (region f in the model), we have all remaining countries.
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Once both regions of the monetary union are de…ned, we aggregate series given the relative time-varying weights of countries in terms of GDP in the region. In ‡ation rates are computed using GDP de ‡ators. Finally, we take the log of GDP, consumption and employment and detrend all series using the HP-…lter. We estimate the model using a large sample of second order moments. We focus on three types of moment: standard deviations (absolute or relative to standard deviation of output), …rst-order autocorrelations and cross-correlations. Standard deviations and autocorrelations concern all Some parameters of the model are calibrated. We set = 0:988; which corresponds to an annual real interest rate of 4:7%, consistent with the average real interest rate over the corresponding period in the EMU. Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , the elasticity of substitution between varieties is = 7; implying an average 16-17% steady state mark-up (compensated at the equilibrium by the optimal subsidy). The average share of public spending in the GDP is set to = 0:25 (see Galí and Monacelli, 2008) . The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is = 1:5 (see Hairault, 2002) . Finally, we calibrate parameters of the nominal interest rate rule using standard values for the smoothing parameter r = 0:7 and for the feedback coe¢ cient on aggregate in ‡ation ' = 1:5 (see Gerlach and Schnabel, 2000) .
Other parameters are estimated. The results of the estimation are reported in Table  2 . The test allowed by over-identifying conditions implies a 0:8035% p-value, which indicates that the model is not rejected by the data. Parameter values are consistent with most estimates or calibrations reported in the literature and are signi…cant. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity is equal to 7:08 and lies on the upper bound of the range put forth by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2006) . This value is consistent with a sluggish response of labour supply to various shocks in the EMU. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of private consumption is = 1:81, close to standard values (see Benigno, 2004) . This parameter governs both the intensity of the transmission of monetary policy through the sensitivity of consumption to the real interest rate and the arbitrage between leisure and consumption. Home bias parameters are = 0:051 and = 0:27 and determine the degree of trade openness of intermediate and …nal goods markets. These values are consistent with those found in Faia (2007) and with standard openness measures calculated using EMU data. The estimation of = 0:0009 is not far from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) . It implies that households have to pay an average annual 0:36% interest rate premium to access …nancial markets. Nominal rigidities parameters are very close since h = 0:5024 and f = 0:5023. Our estimation is lower than usual estimations, as in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) , but matches the values put forth in Alvarez et al. (2006) . Finally, parameters governing shocks'processes are a = 0:9525, g = 0:8862, std( a;t ) = 0:79% and std( g;t ) = 0:99%. These estimations are consistent with most values found in the RBC literature.
Dynamic properties
In this section we study the dynamic properties of the economy when facing asymmetric productivity and public spending shocks. Output rises in both countries, while more substantially in country h; peeking at 0:7% for a 1% productivity shock. In country h, the remaing of productivity gains is used to reduce the labour e¤ort, about 0:25% on impact. This e¤ect arises because the wealth e¤ect dominates in models with separable utility functions and without physical capital. The wealth e¤ect is reinforced by the 0:17% drop of the PPI in ‡ation in the home country.
The transmission of the shock in country f draws both on trade ‡ows and monetary policy. While agents in country h sustain higher production and consumption levels, they generate intermediate and …nal trade ‡ows within the monetary union, which induces a positive reaction of the output in country f of about 0:3% on impact. The common monetary policy also favors a positive transmission. By reacting to aggregate in ‡ation, the central bank lowers its equilibrium nominal interest rate, which induces an increase of aggregate consumption and output in country f: The supply shock in country h thus translates into a positive demand shock in country f , which generates some PPI in ‡ation, peeking at 0:12% on impact and returning quickly to the steady state.
Since wages and production prices drop in country h and rise in country f , both intermediate and …nal terms-of-trade improve in country h. Final goods prices are sluggish, which implies an undershooting of …nal terms-of-trade with respect to the ‡uctuation of intermediate terms-of-trade. Finally, agents in country h accumulate net foreign assets, implying an improvement of the current account peeking at 16-17% of steady state consumption on impact. Output increases of 0:15% on impact in country h, implying a rise of both home and foreign labor supply, required to sustain the demanded quantity of …nal goods in country h. Private consumption drops steadily in both countries. The drop attains 0:13% in country h, because of the crowding-out e¤ect and because Ricardian equivalence holds. The drop is more gentle in country f , reaching 0:08% on impact. Since global demand drops in country f , output clearly falls of 0:07% on impact while returning very quickly to the steady state. Mechanisms behind the negative transmission of a public spending shocks in country h build on a traditional beggar-thy-neighbor e¤ect and highlight the role of home bias in public spending in a …rst approach. However, this e¤ect also relies (i) on the fall of private consumption in country h, implying a drop of country h imports from country f and (ii) on the increase of nominal interest rate implied by the reaction of the central bank to the in ‡ation of country h. The positive demand shock in country h thus translates into a negative demand shock in country f .
External adjustment implies a steady deterioration of …nal and intermediate terms-of-
trade and an accumulation of net foreign liabilities in country h. The corresponding de…cit of the current account peeks at 4:5-5% of steady state consumption on impact.
The welfare gains of trade integration
In this section, we measure the welfare gains arising from a deeper horizontal of vertical trade integration in the EMU.
Welfare indicators
We built an explicit welfare indicator on a second-order approximation of the aggregate utility function. The welfare measure can be expressed as a discounted sum of utility ‡ows,
where q = (1 ) 
where
. In Eq. (6), a tilde denotes the path of variables in the natural equilibrium, de…ned as the equilibrium under ‡exible prices and complete and perfectly integrated asset markets, i.e. h = f = 0 and = 0. Superscripts u and r respectively stand for aggregate and relative variables.
The welfare measure ! penalizes national PPI in ‡ation rates, the aggregate output gap, the relative consumption gap, the relative hours gap and terms-of-trade gaps. The weights a¤ected to national in ‡ation rates are sensitive to the degree of price stickiness through the values of k i . Parameter k i depends negatively on the degree of price rigidities, so that higher weights are deferred to in ‡ation rates when prices are stickier. We compute the consumption equivalent welfare loss. As in Beetsma and Jensen (2005) , is de…ned according to,
where ! 0 measures the welfare for a given reference situation. converts the welfare gains associated to a pareto-superior equilibrium ! 1 into a sizable yardstick in terms of permanent increase of consumption for an unchanged work e¤ort.
Baseline scenario
Running simulations using the baseline estimation, Table 3 contrasts the welfare gains or losses ( ) arising from a deeper horizontal or vertical trade integration consistent with the evidence documented by Baldwin (2006) , i.e. a 10% increase of or . The table also details the evolution of the volatility of variables entering in the welfare loss function. Table 3 The welfare gains of a 10% deeper horizontal ( ) or vertical ( ) trade integration On one hand, a 10% increase of generates large welfare gains, equivalent to an average 13:92% increase of permanent consumption. The overall volatility of terms entering the loss function is clearly dampened. When vertical trade increases, the composition of …nal goods produced becomes more similar, which implies that shocks a¤ecting the production process of intermediate goods asymmetrically have more similar e¤ects on output and marginal costs. This mechanism also contributes to lower the PPI national in ‡ation rates, as illustrated by the new keynesian Phillips curves. If marginal costs, the driving force behind the PPI in ‡ation rates, are more correlated, then the PPI in ‡ation rates are a¤ected in the same way. The adequacy of the common monetary policy to national in ‡ation rates and business cycles increases, which improves its e¤ectiveness and reduces the volatility of national in ‡ation rates. Finally, by the same reasoning, the volatility of intermediate terms-of-trade, relative hours and relative consumptions gaps is reduced, which translates into aggregate welfare gains.
On the other hand, in the baseline scenario, a 10% increase of horizontal trademeasured by a 10% increase of , implies an average welfare loss equivalent to a 1:81% fall of permanent consumption.
A close examination of volatilities shows that the distance of national in ‡ation rates and …nal terms-of-trade from their natural equilibrium path is clearly reduced (respectively by 1:50% in average and 9:12%), which has welfare improving consequences. Since the composition of the CPI in ‡ation rates and private consumption bundles becomes more similar, for a given monetary policy rule, monetary policy becomes more e¤ective and its ability to stabilize national PPI in ‡ation rates increases. These lower national PPI in ‡ation rates result in a lower pressure on …nal terms-of-trade, which clearly reduces their volatility.
However, while external adjustment relies less on the …nal terms-of-trade, the volatility of the current account is enhanced, which leads to welfare losses that more than compensate the previous welfare gains. These losses are imputable to the increased distance of hours and intermediate terms-of-trade to their natural level. The fact that agents use the current account more intensively to adjust asymmetric shocks implies that labor supplies and wages become less correlated and that the volatility of intermediate terms-of-trade, based on relative wages, increases.
These e¤ects arise because debtor (resp. creditor) households need to improve (resp. lower) their labor supply in order to increase (resp. decrease) their earnings and repay their debts (resp. lower their savings) in the medium run. The intensity of this e¤ect clearly depends on the level of costs levied by …nancial intermediaries, that increases the sensitivity of consumptions, labor e¤orts and equilibrium wages to variations of net foreign assets or liabilities. A corollary to the increased volatility of relative labor e¤orts and intermediate terms-of-trade is the increased volatility of relative consumptions. Because the composition of consumptions becomes more similar, relative consumptions should be less volatile. However, the consequences of the greater use of the current account dampen this …rst e¤ect, implying that relative consumptions gaps are more volatile, which is also costly in terms of welfare.
Summing up, an increase in horizontal trade reduces the intensity of ine¢ ciencies caused by nominal rigidities but magni…es ine¢ ciencies related to the imperfect integration of …nancial markets. For the baseline scenario, welfare losses are higher than welfare gains.
Our results match those of other studies that quantitify the welfare gains associated to the reduction of various distortions in the economy. Canzoneri et al. (2006) estimate that the welfare costs of nominal inertia can reach 4% to 5%, mostly depending on the degree of persistence in the economy. In our model, the value of the Frisch elasiticty is low, the assumption of imperfect risk-sharing adds an important source of persistence, and the estimated persistence of shocks is quite high. The overall persistence is thus important and, consistently with Canzoneri et al. (2006) , nominal inertia is quite costly in terms of welfare in our model. Several studies also quantify the welfare gains of …nancial markets integration, building on higher risk-sharing and consumption smoothing. For example, Van Wincoop (1999) …nds that the welfare gains from risksharing range from 1% to more than 7% of consumption. Those welfare gains could actually be much higher according to previous studies using alternative methods to measure …nancial markets integration (see Lewis, 1996) . More recently, Demyanyk and Volosovych (2008) document that the welfare gains of …nancial markets integration range from 1% of permanent consumption for EMU members to more than 8% for new European Union members. In our model, both sources of welfare losses (nominal inertia and imperfect risk-sharing) are combined and to yield important welfare losses.
As suggested by Dotsey and Ireland (1996) , this combination of various frictions may actually result in important welfare losses.
Sensitivity analysis
We investigate the robustness of our results to a wide range of parameters variations. The simulations have been run to evaluate the sensitivity of our results to the asymmetry in the pattern of nominal rigidities. Since these simulations show that asymmetries in the pattern of nominal rigidities do not play a signi…cant role in generating our results, they are not reported but available. Figure 3 reports the sensitivity of welfare gains or losses associated to a 10% increase in horizontal trade to di¤erent variations in the set of structural parameters. Depending on parametrization, the overall welfare e¤ect of horizontal trade integration is either positive or negative.
When portfolio management costs ( ) fall under a certain threshold, between 0:09% and 0:1%, or when nominal rigidities are beyond 0:6, horizontal trade integration generates welfare gains. This is the case either because the enhanced volatility of the current account become less costly or because the reduction of national PPI in ‡ation rates generates higher welfare gains. These results clearly show that frictions on …nancial markets are a key assumption to generate our results. This assumption introduces welfare losses related to imperfect risk-sharing among members of the monetary union. The sensitivity analysis reveals that small frictions ( = 0:09% implies that households have to pay an average 0:36% annual interest rate premium to access …nancial markets) are su¢ cient to mitigate the welfare gains of lower in ‡ation rates when horizontal trade increases. One shall also notice that the welfare gains of lower national in ‡ation rates clearly surpass welfare losses when nominal rigidities parameters take standard values of the literature (around 0:7-0:75).
The sensitivity of welfare gains/losses to variations of the elasticity of substitution between intermediate or …nal goods also illustrates the mechanism behind welfare gains or losses. As the elasticity of substitution between …nal goods ( ) increases, changes in the volatility of …nal terms-of-trade implied by an enhanced horizontal trade integration are lower. In the equilibrium, the volatility of PPI in ‡ation rates is thus reduced, while the impact of on the volatility of the current account is clearly positive (see the equation governing net foreign assets dynamics in Table A .1). Welfare gains related to lower national in ‡ation rates are thus dampened, while welfare losses caused by the increased volatility of the current account increase. As a consequence, net welfare gains of horizontal trade integration depend negatively on the elasticity of substitution between …nal goods. On the contrary, as the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods ( ) increases, intermediate terms-of-trade are less required to ‡uctuate to reach the equilibrium on intermediate goods markets, ceteris paribus. As a consequence, the rise of the volatility of intermediate terms-of-trade, relative hours and relative consumptions gaps are reduced when horizontal trade increases, which has a positive impact on welfare gains.
Finally, the sensitivity of welfare gains to the inverse of the Frisch elasticity ( ) and the risk-aversion parameter ( ) is also investigated. When the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply ( ) increases, the volatility of hours decreases in the equilibrium. Since welfare losses related to …nancial frictions depend on the response of labor supply -as documented in the previous subsection, lower responses of labor supplies imply lower overall welfare losses or higher overall welfare gains when horizontal trade integration increases. The e¤ect of the risk-aversion parameter is somehow surprising. The riskaversion parameter governs the willingness of households to smooth their consumption over time when undergoing unexpected asymmetric shocks, which is associated with an increased use of …nancial markets, and should lead to higher welfare losses. However, Figure 3 tells us that these aspects are more than compensated by the drop of the volatility of terms-of-trade and of national in ‡ation rates. Risk-aversion is thus found to have a positive impact on the welfare gains generated by an increase in horizontal trade integration.
Second, …gure 4 reports the sensitivity of welfare gains or losses associated to a 10% increase in vertical trade to di¤erent variations in the set of structural parameters. Welfare gains generated by a 10% deeper vertical trade integration are clearly increasing with the degree of nominal rigidities ( ), since the reduction of national in ‡ation rates is both enhanced and more weighted in the loss function.
These gains are bearly sensitive to the level of portfolio management costs ( ), which con…rms that …nancial markets do not play an important role when trade integration is vertical.
The welfare gains of a deeper vertical trade integration also clearly decrease with the degree of substitutability between goods. While the decrease is important when the substitutability of …nal goods ( ) increases (from more than 15% of permanent consumption when = 1 to 10% when = 15), welfare gains decline even more when the substitutability of intermediate goods ( ) increases (from 14% of permanent consumption when = 1 to 0% when = 15). Finally, an increase of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor supply ( ) has a negative impact on the welfare gains of vertical trade integration for most plausible values ( > 1). In the case of vertical trade integration, the volatility of the current account decreases. The softening e¤ect of an increase of on the volatility of labor supplies thus a¤ects welfare gains in the opposite direction. Indeed, in the equilibrium, higher values of imply lower volatilities of hours worked, which slows down the process of reduction of regional di¤erences in hours and lowers welfare gains of vertical trade integration.
Conclusion
This paper shows that horizontal and vertical trade integration have di¤erent outcomes in terms of welfare in a monetary union characterized by business cycles asymmetries and in ‡ation di¤erentials. In both cases, a deeper trade integration reduces in ‡ation di¤erentials by favoring a better di¤usion of shocks from one country to an another, through increased trade ‡ows. This increased macroeconomic interdependence helps the common monetary policy to be in line with national situations. Equilibrium national in ‡ation rates decrease, and imply that trade integration thus generates welfare gains.
However, horizontal trade integration improves the volatility of the current account while vertical trade integration reduces the overall need for external adjustment in case of asymmetric shocks. As a consequence, horizontal trade integration implies welfare losses that might exceed the previous welfare gains.
For the baseline estimation presented in this paper, horizontal trade integration produces welfare losses equivalent to an average 1.8% drop of permanent consumption and vertical trade integration generates welfare gains that amount to an average 13.9% of permanent consumption. However, an extensive sensitivity analysis indicates that the relative importance of …nancial markets frictions and nominal rigidities plays a key role in the pattern of welfare gains or losses.
The main conclusion of the paper is that …nancial frictions, as well as their interactions with real and nominal rigidities should carefully be taken into account when analyzing business cycles asymmetries in open economies and/or monetary unions.
APPENDIX
A Log-linear approximation of the model where, after using the symmetry among agents, Using the fact that,
we get,
the welfare simpli…es to, 
